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In this paper, we analyze how an airline can take advantage of airport do-
minance of a whole network in a market characterized by short-haul rou-
tes and congestion. We estimate an equation system, which is based on
theoretical grounds, for the Spanish market. We find that costs and de-
mand benefits of airport dominance have to do with providing a high
flight frequency. The high flight frequency that comes from the control
of an airport network allows to be offered large discounts in fares to lei-
sure travelers while charging higher fares for business travelers. Such be-
nefits can seriously damage the competitive status of airlines that do not
have a high airport presence. We conclude that a balanced allocation of
airport slots is required to guarantee airline competition.
Key words: Competition, air transport, multiple equation models.
JEL classification: L13, L93, C30.
A
ir transport liberalization has produced positive effects on traveler welfare.
Indeed, travelers enjoy a greater choice of alternatives, higher flight frequen-
cy and lower prices on the busiest routes. Nevertheless, there is a wide-
spread agreement that the achievement, maintenance and increase of these
benefits in the post-liberalization period depends fundamentally on effec-
tive competition on those routes. It follows that there is concern about the scale
advantages airlines can hold in several markets as a consequence of their domi-
nance of airport access.
In the European Union (EU), the allocation of slots is generally based on
grandfather rights that give “ownership” to airlines on the basis of previous use.
Hence, former flag carriers, which in the past enjoyed privileged monopolistic
rights, can now claim large shares of slots in the main airports of their national
network. This is particularly important in cases of airport congestion. Low cost
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zation of Air Transport - Experience and the Next Steps Forward. The usual disclaimer applies.airlines operating through regional airports have succeeded in competing with for-
mer flag carriers on an increasing number of routes but the “low cost effect” also
relies on access to those regional airports.
There is extensive empirical literature on competition in the airline industry. The
effect of airport dominance on airline prices is one of the main issues that emerge
from this literature. Major contributions for the US case are, among others, Boren-
stein (1989, 1991), Hurdle et al. (1989), Morrison and Winston (1989), Dresner and
Windle (1992), Evans and Kessides (1993) and Brueckner and Spiller (1994). But-
ton et al. (1998) and Marín (1998), among others, discuss airline competition in the
European context. It is generally found that airport dominance, along with route
dominance, explains the ability of major airlines to charge higher prices than their
competitors. In these studies, airport dominance usually implies higher prices due to
the “premium” that major airlines can charge to passengers departing from their
main hubs. Indeed, hub dominance can imply the exploitation of market power due
to privileged access to airport facilities (slots, gates and so on) and to the use of
marketing practices such as frequent flyer programs. These aspects are considered
to be important entry barriers, particularly in cases of congestion.
However, product differentiation has not usually been treated as a primary
assumption in previous studies. Important exceptions are the works of Marín
(1995), Berry et al. (1996) and Schipper et al. (2002). Looking directly at differ-
entiation in the airline industry is sensible if we are to explicitly test the cost and
demand advantages of airport dominance. In addition, it is worth noting that the
airport dominance of former European flag carriers can be even higher in small
regional airports since low cost airlines only operate in some of them. Finally, in
contrast to the United States, a common characteristic of EU domestic air markets
is that they are basically made up of short-haul routes.
The objective of this paper is to examine how an airline can take advantage of
airport dominance of a whole network in a European market characterized by short-
haul routes and congestion. We estimate an empirical model using data from Span-
ish air routes for 2001 and 2002. As the Spanish domestic market is the largest in
the European Union, results obtained in this paper are relevant for other European
markets. Additionally, the analysis of the Spanish market allows us to capture the
influence of airport congestion on airline competition. The airports of either Madrid
or Barcelona are the endpoints of most Spanish routes and, during the period con-
sidered, both of them were highly congested.
The remainder of this paper fleshes out the effects of airport dominance on
short-haul markets and tests them empirically. In Section 1, economic features
that have the greatest influence on airline competition are analyzed. Section 2 pre-
sents the framework for the hypotheses that are to be tested in the empirical
analysis. In Section 3, data used in the empirical analysis is specified. Section 4
describes the results obtained from the estimation. Finally, Section 5 discusses the
implications of the results obtained.
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Competition in the provision of air transport services depends both on de-
mand and supply characteristics. On the supply side, the seminal study of Caves et
al. (1984) distinguishes between density and scale economies. Density economies
refer to unit cost variations due to output increases on a route. Scale economies
refer to unit cost variations due to proportional changes both in network size and in
the output on each route conforming the network. The issue here is that, although
the existence of density economies is generally accepted, there is no clear evidence
of the existence of scale economies [Tretheway and Oum (1992)].
On the demand side, one must note the existence of two different types of
travelers. On the one hand, business travelers are not as sensitive to prices but pay
considerable attention to time1. Leisure travelers, on the other hand, are time in-
sensitive but highly price sensitive. Furthermore, air transport is one clear exam-
ple of an industry with consumer switching costs. This is due to the use of fre-
quent flier programs (FFP) which create brand loyalty in travelers once they have
bought services from a particular airline. Indeed, travelers who switch between
airlines lose opportunities to earn points that yield benefits, such as free trips.
Thus, switching costs are associated with the opportunity cost of these benefits2.
Recognizing that density economies and demand heterogeneity are both promi-
nent characteristics of the airline industry, it is clear that airport dominance may pro-
vide strong competitive advantages to airlines that take benefit of it. In fact, previous
empirical studies about airline competition agree with this point. However, we can
find different explanations of these competitive advantages in the literature. An air-
line can obtain advantages from airport dominance due to the exploitation of market
power that comes from its privileged access to scarce resources [Borenstein (1989,
1991), Evans and Kessides (1993)]. Moreover, airlines with a high presence in an air-
port can make better use of marketing practices such as frequent flyer programs
[Borenstein (1989, 1991, 1996), Mason and Baker (1996)]. Both explanations imply
that airport dominance allows airlines to charge higher prices. Finally, an airline can
reduce costs (and so prices) from a high utilization of an airport through the exploita-
tion of density economies [Marin (1995), Berry et al. (1996)].
Our aim in this paper is to contribute to the literature by examining the different
effects of airport dominance for the Spanish domestic market, which is a market
based on short-haul routes. In this type of market, the benefits from airport domi-
nance come from the role played by flight frequency. A higher flight frequency al-
lows a better adjustment to traveler scheduling preferences and, in turn, reduces wait-
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(1) It can be argued that business passengers are increasingly using the services of low cost airli-
nes on inter-European routes. This is particularly true on routes where low cost airlines offer a high
flight frequency due to the dominance of the corresponding regional airports.
(2) Klemperer (1987) analyses the role of switching costs in a two-stage model of oligopoly com-
petition. In this model, price competition depends inversely on those costs. This relationship fo-
llows from the fact that a higher switching cost means that lower prices attract fewer consumers
and, at the same time, lead to a greater sacrifice of profits from those consumers who are already
members of a FFP.ing time. Along with the business traveler’s preference for airlines that offer flexibili-
ty in flight schedule, the demand side advantages that arise from high frequency are
also related to FFP. A greater number of destinations make a free trip more valuable,
and higher flight frequency at each airport speeds up the accumulation of points. In-
deed, flight frequency can be understood as a quality variable because it determines
waiting time and allows a more efficient exploitation of FFP.
In turn, these advantages on the demand side do not exclude the exploitation of
density economies on the cost side. As long as a high flight frequency reduces the
cost of a trip in terms of time, it could cause an additional increase in demand. A
high flight frequency also leads to a high annual utilization of planes and crews [Do-
ganis (1991)]. Furthermore, frequency allows a carrier to increase the proportion of
business travelers per flight, which reduces the break-even load factor [OECD
(2000)]. Finally, the cost diseconomies that arise from the use of smaller planes as
frequency rises are especially important on long-haul routes [Wei and Hansen
(2003)]3. For short routes, a high flight frequency is not necessarily cost damaging,
whereas the demand side advantages can be substantial. In fact, the increasing im-
portance of regional operators that use smaller aircrafts with higher flight frequency
in thin markets shows the important role that frequency plays on short-haul routes.
The main determinant of flight frequency in a given route network (and the
size of this network) is the number of slots that an airline can use in the correspond-
ing airports. Airlines could benefit from airport dominance by providing a high
flight frequency. Indeed, they can capture business travelers through the exploitation
of demand side economies and, at the same time, they can take advantage of cost
economies to capture leisure travelers. Hence, we want to test whether airport
dominance allows high prices in the fares addressed to business travelers and
large discounts in the fares addressed to leisure travelers. In the following section,
we develop a methodology to test the effects of airport dominance in short-haul
airline markets.
2. THE EMPIRICAL MODEL
2.1. Demand
Given that service frequency is the main determinant of quality in short-haul
air transport markets, demand conditions in a vertical product differentiation
model must be stated. In a typical product differentiation model [Anderson et al.
(1992)], the demand for a product with a specific quality depends on the potential
number of consumers, the prices and quality of that product and on other varieties
of that product. In our model, we denote demand of airline in market (route) “k”
by Qjk. Services of airline “j” are associated with a set of prices and a specific
flight frequency (which determines quality).
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(3) Aircraft costs correspond to three stages: takeoff, in-flight time and landing. With regard to the
size of the aircraft, scale diseconomies arise in takeoff and landing, while scale economies arise at
the cruise speed. This explains why aircrafts that minimize costs are smaller on short-haul than on
long-haul routes.The price of each transport service is not unique because airlines can dis-
criminate across passengers (i.e; business or leisure travelers), using different
fares with different restrictions. The available data does not allow the estimation
of a demand equation that includes the prices effectively charged to each passen-
ger. On the contrary, we must rely on aggregate demand data to account for the
different competition conditions associated with the different types of passengers.
However, it can be argued that quality effects will be mostly related to business
passengers and price effects will be mostly related to leisure passengers.
For the empirical specification, the demand for the transport services of air-
line “j” (j = 1, …, n) that competes on route “k”, (Qjk), can be expressed as the
product of a market demand function (Qk) and an airline market share function
(MSjk), where MSjk = Qjk/Qk.
Thus, and taking into account that the equilibrium condition in a vertical
product differentiation model excludes cross price elasticities among firms, an air-
line’s demand function can be expressed as:
Qjk = Qk (Pk,Sk,Nk) MSjk (Pjk/Pk,S jk/Sk), [1]
where market demand (Qk) depends on average quality (Sk), average price (Pk)
and the potential number of travelers (Nk). The market share of each airline
(MSjk) depends on its own quality (Sjk) and price (Pjk), compared to market aver-
age values (Sk,P k).
Imposing the logarithmic form, the empirical specification for the demand
equation on route k can be expressed as follows:
log(Qk) = α1 + β11log(Pk) + β12log(Sk) + β13log(Nk) + β14Disland +
+ β15win01 + β16sum02 + ε1k, [2]
where the dependent variable is the total number of passengers carried on each
route (Qk). We include the following explanatory variables in the demand equation:
1) Average price on route k (Pk).
In order to account for the different fares, we approximate average prices
through the average prices in the full economy fare (Peco
k) and a dummy variable
(Ddiscount
k) that takes value 1 where airlines set relevant discounts on the full
economy fare and zero otherwise.
The full economy fare is defined as the economy fare without discounts,
without restrictions on changes and refunds and without minimum stay require-
ments. Full economy fares can be considered to be a reference for all other fares.
Business and lowest fares are calculated by airlines by applying a mark-up and a
discount, respectively, on full economy fares.
The variable for price discounts is constructed as the ratio between average
prices in the lowest fares and full economy fares. We evaluate the existence of
relevant discounts, using statistical. Discounts are considered to be relevant when
the price ratio considered takes a value lower than the standard deviation with re-
spect to the mean. This dummy variable interacts with the average price in the full
economy fares. Thus, the final expression of the average prices on route “k” is as
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The discussion about switching costs and frequent flier variables in Section 1
refers to the demand effects, especially for business trips, of flight frequency as a
quality variable. Hence, the variable for quality in the empirical specification of the
demand equation refers to flight frequency.
One must take into account the possible endogeneity of frequency since vari-
ations in demand can be adjusted to through variations in service frequency. This
frequency depends on the quantity and spread of an airline’s slots in the corre-
sponding airports. The availability of new slots in the period considered, 2001 and
2002, was very low in the main Spanish airports and the allocation rules for the
existing slots are tight, which supports the exogeneity of this variable. However,
we estimate two alternative versions of the demand equation according to the
treatment of this variable.
3) Potential number of consumers on route “k” (Nk) is approximated through
the average population of the origin and destination regions of the route.
4) We include a dummy variable that takes value 1 for routes that have an is-
land as an endpoint (Disland
k) as route fixed effects. This variable can capture traf-
fic generation due to the lack of competition from other transport modes and due
to the tourism effect.
5) We include dummy variables for winter 2001 (win01) and summer 2002
(sum02) as seasonal effects. According to the period of our data set, this means
that summer 2001 is considered to be the baseline period.
6) ε1k is a random error term.
Imposing the logarithmic form, the empirical specification for the market
share equation of airline “j” on route “k” can be expressed as follows:
log(MSjk) = α2 + β21(Pjk/Pk) + β22log(Sjk/Sk) + β23Disland +
+ β24win01 + β25sum02 + ε2jk [3]
where the dependent variable is the market share of each airline on the route in
terms of passengers carried (MSjk). We include the following explanatory variables
in the market share equation:
1) The relative prices of each airline with respect to the market average (Pjk/Pk).
Airline price differences in full economy fares are small4. In addition, we ex-
pect that these differences are fundamentally related to the different levels of
quality, which are captured through the relative flight frequency.
Thus, we approximate the price effect in the market share equation through
the dummy variable for relevant discounts on the full economy fares, which is
constructed in the same way as the analogous variable for the demand equation.
Discounts are considered to be relevant (and the dummy variable takes value 1)
when the ratio between the prices charged by each airline in the lowest fare and
average market prices in the full economy fare takes a value lower than the stan-
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(4) Our data show a much more homogeneous distribution of the base fare than of the discounts
across airlines. Indeed, the variation coefficient of the variable for the relative prices in the full eco-
nomy fare is 0.07 while the variation coefficient of the variable for the discounts is 0.24.dard deviation with respect to the mean. Thus, the variable for relative prices in
the empirical specification of the market share equation refers to the dummy vari-
able for price discounts (Pjk/Pk = Ddiscount
jk).
2) The relative quality of the product of each airline with respect to the mar-
ket average (Sjk/Sk).
As we mention above, the quality effect on the demand side is approximated
through flight frequency. Hence the variable for relative quality in the empirical
specification of the market share equation is measured through the relative flight
frequency of each airline with respect to the route average.
It may be necessary to account for the possible endogeneity of the relative
frequency if we find such endogeneity for the analogous variable in the demand
equation.
3) As in the demand equation, we add a set of control variables for the empi-
rical specification, which refer to route and seasonal fixed effects. We include a
dummy variable for routes that have an island as an endpoint (Disland
k) as route
fixed effects and dummy variables for winter 2001 (win01) and summer 2002
(sum02) as seasonal effects. In the analysis of short-haul airline markets, a relevant
feature of routes where islands are one of the endpoints is the lack of competition
from other transport modes. This could distort airline competition for this type of
routes because collusion behavior is easier to implement here. In addition to this,
concerning the market examined in the empirical analysis, rivals of the former
Spanish flag carrier have a long tradition as providers of charter flights. Thus, sys-
tematic differences across carriers in terms of market share can be expected ac-
cording to the type of endpoints where they address their services.
4) ε2jk is a random error term.
The sign of the variables for relative prices and relative flight frequency can
be seen as evidence of the way in which airlines compete to attract the different
types of travelers. Since, a positive sign can be expected in the coefficient of the
variable for price discounts, given that competition to attract leisure passengers
should focus fundamentally on prices. So, higher discounts should be associated
with a higher market share of leisure passengers. Additionally, a positive sign is
expected in the variable for relative frequency. This effect should be associated
primarily with business passengers.
2.2. Supply
Having determined the demand conditions, we need to characterize airline
competition in a non-cooperative oligopoly framework. We assume a two-stage
decision by airlines. In the first stage, airlines choose capacity, which depends on
the aircraft fleet and flight frequency. Thus, perceived quality is determined in this
first stage. In the second stage, given the capacities and quality offered by all air-
lines, they choose prices. Kreps and Scheinkman (1983) show that a two-stage
game, in which two firms make simultaneous determinations of first capacity and
then price, is equivalent to the traditional one-stage Cournot model. Moreover,
several empirical studies find that airlines’ market behavior is similar to the
Cournot solution [Brander and Zhang (1990), Oum et al. (1993)]. Thus, the as-
sumption of competition à la Cournot is reasonable.
Infrastructure dominance in short-haul air transport markets
141Revista de Economía Aplicada
142
Given the demand conditions previously formulated, the inverse market de-
mand function takes the following form:
Pk = F(Qk,S k,N k), [4]
where quality (Sk) refers to flight frequency. The cost function can be expressed
as follows:
Cjk = Cjk (Distk,,Q jk, ωj) [5]
where Cjk is the total costs of airline “j” from operating on route “k”. Total airline
costs depend on route distance (Distk), output (Qjk) and input prices (ωj). It must
be said that the empirical model exploits differences across routes, so that the ex-
clusion of input prices (mainly wages and salaries) should not affect the results
given that they can be considered airline specific fixed costs5.
The reduced form of the Cournot profit function for each airline j = 1, ..., n in
market “k” can be expressed as follows:
πjk(Qk) = QjkPk(.) – Cjk(.). [6]
Profit maximization by each airline “j” leads to the following set of first
order conditions:
(5) It is also worth noting that an airline’s output is determined by the product of service frequency,
aircraft size and load factor. We argue that the main effect on costs of all these aspects refer to the
exploitation of density economies so that their impact should be mostly captured by the variable for
demand. Data availability do not allow us to consider other additional aspects, such as the type of
engine used by the plane. The possible bias of not considering these other additional aspects in the
interpretation of the results of the empirical analysis must be taken into account.
[7] P (.) C' (.)
P
1
E (S /S )(n 1)
jk jk




where Ejk is the specific price-demand elasticity of each airline, C’jk is the margin-
al cost (C’jk = ∂Cjk/∂Qjk) and nk is the number of competitors. From [7], it is pos-
sible to identify the pricing equation as a mark-up on marginal costs:
Pjk = φjk(Sjk/Sk,n k) C’jk (Distk,Q jk), [8]
where the mark-up (φjk) is a function of the airlines’ relative quality (Sjk/Sk) and
the number of competitors (nk), while marginal costs (C’jk) are a function of route
distance (Distk) and the number of passengers carried on it (Qjk).
In airline markets one must account for the price that is charged to each pas-
senger. However, the available data does not allow the estimation of a pricing
equation at that level of detail. Under the Cournot assumption, prices are under-
stood as a mark-up on marginal costs. As we mention above, full economy fares
can be considered to be a price reference for all other fares so that prices of the
lowest fare can be understood as a discount on prices of the full economy fare.
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Thus, our approach relies on estimating a pricing equation for the full econo-
my fare and identifying the determinants of discounts on the lowest fare through a
binary choice model. In this way, the discount policy can be stated as a discrete
choice (Ddiscount
jk) of making or not making discounts of a significant amount,
which can be expressed as follows:
Ujk = F(C’jk/C’k,n k)
Ddiscount
jk = 1 if Ujk > 0 [9]
0 if Ujk ≤ 0
where Ujk is the utility that airlines obtain from discounts. This utility depends on
the airlines’ relative marginal costs with regard to the market average (C’jk/C’k),
which is mostly determined by cost economies related to traffic density. Airlines
with lower relative costs should be more willing to cut prices because the prof-
itability of this strategy should be higher for them. In addition, the utility that air-
lines obtain from discounts also depends on the intensity of competition (nk),
which approximates the benefits of discounts in terms of attracting passengers.
Imposing the logarithmic form, the empirical specification for the airlines’
pricing equation in the full economy fare can be expressed as follows:
log(Pjk) = α3 + β31log(Distk) + β32log(Qjk) + β33log(Sjk) +
+ β34log(HHIk) + β35win01 + β36sum02 + ε3jk, [10]
where the dependent variable is prices of the full economy fare (Pjk). The explana-
tory variables included in this pricing equation are the following:
1) The number of kilometers that separate the origin and destination airports
of the route (Distk).
This variable allows us to estimate the cost economies related to actual rout-
ing distance. Although the analysis focuses on short-haul routes, there is still
some variation in the kilometers flown across the routes of our sample. There are
several reasons for costs increasing less than proportionally to kilometers flown.
Longer routes involve higher average speeds, less intensive consumption of fuel
and a lower frequency of some fixed costs (such as airport fees).
2) The number of passengers carried for each airline on the route (Qjk),
which allows an estimate of cost economies related to route traffic density. Recall
that the existence of density economies in the provision of air transport services is
generally accepted.
3) The quality of the product offered by each airline (Sjk).
This quality is measured through a variable for airport presence, which is built
through the average share of each airline, in terms of annual national departures, in
the origin and destination airports of the route. Hence, the variable for quality in the
empirical specification of the pricing equation refers to airport presence.
As we mention above, the discussion about switching costs and frequent flier
variables in Section 1 refers to the demand effects, especially for business trips, of
flight frequency as a quality variable. Given that airport presence and flight fre-Revista de Economía Aplicada
144
quency are correlated, the use of the former variable seems to be appropriate in
the analysis of the prices charged by airlines since one of our main goals is to test
the effects of airport dominance on the supply side.
This variable can have a cost effect in terms of the exploitation of density
economies but this effect should be captured by the variable for demand.
4) The Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHIk) to accurately assess the effect of
the intensity of competition on prices. It must be taken into account that our sam-
ple is based on non monopoly routes.
5) We add a set of control variables for the empirical specification, which
refer to seasonal fixed effects. These variables are constructed in the same way as
the analogous variables in the demand and market share equations.
6) ε3jk is a random error term.
The empirical specification for the discount policy equation takes the follow-
ing form:
Ddiscount
jk = δ + γ1log(equipjk/equipk)jk + γ2log(APjk/APk)jk +
+ γ3HHIk + γ4Disland
k + γ5win01 + γ6sum02 + ηjk, [11]
where the dependent variable (Ddiscount
jk) is a dummy variable that takes value 1
when the ratio between average and the full economy fare takes a value lower
than the standard deviation with respect to the mean.
The explanatory variables included in this equation are the following:
1) The relative size of the aircraft used by airlines with respect to the market
average (equipjk/equipk).
2) The share of each airline, in terms of departures, in the corresponding air-
ports of the route with respect to the market average (APjk/ APk).
3) The Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHIk) to accurately assess the effect of
the intensity of competition on discounts.
4) We include a dummy variable for routes with an island as an endpoint
(Disland
k) as route fixed effects. The dummy variable for routes where islands are one
of the endpoints can affect discounts in two opposite ways. First, discounts could be
higher since more leisure travelers are expected at islands destinations. Secondly, dis-
counts could be lower since competition coming from other transport modes does
not take place here. Thus, the sign of the coefficient for this variable is ambiguous.
5) We include dummy variables for winter 2001 (win01) and summer 2002
(sum02) as seasonal fixed effects.
6) ηjk is a random error term.
The variables for the size of the aircraft and airport presence can have both
costs (related to density economies) and quality effects. Nevertheless, we do not
expect a significant quality effect in the fares addressed to leisure passengers.
The cost effect related to density economies could be captured by a demand
variable but our policy discount equation allows us to take the role of airport pres-
ence into account when calculating the probability of making discounts. Indeed,
the main interest of this equation is to explicitly capture the influence of airport
dominance on the probability that airlines will make discounts to attract price-
sensitive consumers.Infrastructure dominance in short-haul air transport markets
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The fact that a major airport presence allows airlines to charge higher prices
in the fares addressed to business travelers and, additionally, allows more frequent
discounts in the fares addressed to leisure travelers, would be consistent with the
argument that airlines derive competitive advantages from airport dominance
through product differentiation.
3. DATA
The sample used in the empirical analysis is composed of 35 Spanish domes-
tic routes in which more than one airline is operating with regular flights, and we
differentiate between the summer and winter seasons. In general terms, the struc-
ture of prices (in the full fares) and flight schedules of airlines vary between, but
not within, seasons. This inter-season variation is especially important in the Span-
ish case because it is a strongly tourist-oriented market. We include dummy vari-
ables for season (win01, sum02) to capture seasonal fixed-effects. It is worth not-
ing that the period considered encompasses the period in which the terrorists
attacks of September 11th took place, which led to a worldwide downturn of de-
mand for air transport services6. The choice of this period for the empirical analy-
sis is related to the availability of traffic data at the airline and route level.
The data set considers round trips for 35 routes with non-stop services. It is
important to point out that the demand data does not distinguish between connect-
ing and final traffic. In this way, there is always an interaction with the passengers
connecting to other destinations that influences the final price of the ticket. The
potential bias of this data limitation should be taken into account when interpret-
ing the results of the empirical analysis.
Demand data has been obtained from Spanish Civil Aviation. Data on fre-
quency, aircraft size and prices have been obtained for a sample week for each
season. Information regarding flight frequency and aircraft size has been obtained
from the Official Airlines Guide (OAG). The round trip prices, differentiating be-
tween the lowest fares, the full economy fares and the business fares charged by
each airline, have been obtained from their respective websites.
Variables of prices for the different fares are used in order to capture demand
heterogeneity. Unfortunately, a weighted distribution of passengers in the differ-
ent fares is not available. This could affect our results if the distribution varies
substantially across routes and airlines. The use of variables that refer to route
characteristics can help in controlling for these differences.
There is a high variability in the prices charged by airlines in the lowest fare. In
order to account for this variability, we have obtained this data under homogeneous
conditions for each airline. That is, data have been collected one month before travel-
(6) According to the Airports Council International (ACI), the worldwide reduction in the number
of passengers moved was 2.5 per cent in 2001 and 0.2 per cent in 2002. Data of the Spanish airport
agency (AENA) indicate that the total number of passengers moved by Spanish airports decreased
by 1.1 per cent in 2002 (while traffic increased in 2001). The decrease in domestic passenger traf-
fic was 2.3 per cent in 2002. According to the Ministry of Transport, the traffic reduction was
lower for Iberia than for its competitors.Revista de Economía Aplicada
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ing, the price is for the first trip of the week and the return is on Sunday. However,
this homogeneous procedure for obtaining our data does not avoid a possible bias
when using the variable for discounts in a continuous form because airlines can easi-
ly and rapidly adjust discount prices. This explains our preference for using the vari-
able for discounts in a discrete form. Furthermore, it must be said that our variable
for price discounts refers to the maximum discount that can be obtained in a specific
time period but not to the number of travelers that can make use of this maximum
discount. In this way, it can be expected that travelers with a flexible schedule (usual-
ly leisure travelers) benefit to a greater extent from these discounts.
The population variable is the total average population in the regions of ori-
gin and destination of a route, obtained from the Statistics National Institute.
Data on the percentage of national departures of airlines from origins and des-
tinations for each season have been obtained from the Spanish Airports and Air
Navigation (AENA) agency. As we mentioned above, the variable for airport pres-
ence is built through the average share of each airline, in terms of annual national
departures, at the origin and destination airports of the route. An alternative measure
of airport presence could be the share of each airline in terms of annual domestic
departures at the origin airport. However, as Tables A1 and A2 in the appendix
show, the former seems to be a better measure in our context because the sample is
based on three origin airports and the share of the former Spanish flag carrier is
high in the majority of origin and destination airports for the period considered.
Finally, a few facts about the Spanish air transport market must be considered.
The main competitor of the former Spanish flag carrier, Iberia, is Spanair, mainly
owned by the Scandinavian airline, SAS. In third place is Air Europa, owned by a
firm devoted to tourist activities. Iberia was privatized in a gradual process that
finished in 2001. British Airways is currently one of Iberia’s major shareholders.
According to the Spanish Civil Aviation (Ministry of Transport), the Spanish air
market is made up of about 100 routes, and Iberia had a monopoly on half of
them in the period considered. On routes where Spanair and/or Air Europa offer
services, Iberia’s market share ranged from 50 to 90 per cent. Table 1 shows the
descriptive statistics of the main variables used in the empirical analysis.
4. ESTIMATION AND RESULTS
The demand, market share and pricing equations are estimated as an equa-
tion system, with the policy discount equation estimated separately from the other
equations. It can be easily shown that our system of equations is over-identified. It
is common to estimate over-identified systems through some methods based on
instrumental variables. In this way, all the equations of the system are estimated
through the Two Stage Least Squares estimator (TSLS). Estimates have been
made equation by equation, providing the other equations of the system with the
instruments for the endogenous explanatory variables of each equation. A simul-
taneous estimation of the system is considered to be more efficient, but any possi-
ble misspecification of an equation is transferred to the rest of the system.
Table 2 shows the results for the demand equation where prices are treated
as endogenous variables. All explanatory variables have the expected signs, al-Infrastructure dominance in short-haul air transport markets
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Table 1: DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS
Variables (route level) Mean Standard Minimum Maximum
deviation value value
Traffic density (number 376.242 417.447 17.525 2.413.967
of passengers per season)
Round trip prices 264.45 108.42 99.78 535.28
(full economy class; euros)
Price discounts (percentage) 0.68 0.16 0.33 1
Weekly flight frequency 79 76.28 11 445
Population of the city-pairs 2.887 893.713 841.668 5.114.656
Distance 746 647 131 2.190
Airline´s market share (percentage) 0.39 0.22 0.01 0.92
Herfindahl-Hirschman Index 0.51 0.12 0.33 0.85
Source: Own elaboration.
Table 2: DEMAND EQUATION RESULTS – TSLS – (N = 85)
Instruments for log(Pk) and log(Sk): log(Distk), log(equipk), log(APk), log(Dnk)
Coefficients (White standard errors; Robust to heterocedasticity)
Explanatory variables Dependent variable: log(Qk)
(1) (2)
Sk (exogenous) Sk (endogenous)
Intercept 0.75 (1.63) 0.73 (2.32)
log(Pk) -0.54 (0.11)*** -0.56 (0.19)***
log(Pk)Ddiscount
k 0.03 (0.09) 0.04 (0.10)
log(Sk) 1.06 (0.05)*** 1.10 (0.09)***
log(Nk) 0.47 (0.11)*** 0.45 (0.17)***
Disland
k 0.15 (0.10) 0.14 (0.11)
win01k -0.36 (0.08)*** -0.35 (0.08)***
sum02k 0.21 (0.07)*** 0.21 (0.07)***
R2adj. 0.91 0.90
F-Statistic 129.04*** 86.84***
1. Significance at the 1% (***), 5% (**), 10%(*).
2. The variable for quality (Sk) is measured through flight frequency (FQk).
Source: Own elaboration.Revista de Economía Aplicada
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though the dummy variable for islands is not significant. We found that the pos-
sible bias of considering frequency as an exogenous variable is modest, as could
be expected from restrictions regarding the use of slots. Given the potential num-
ber of travelers and the fixed effects, it is found that prices and flight frequency
are the main determinants of demand. The overall significance of the demand
equation is very high.
In addition, our results show a relatively high elasticity of demand to flight
frequency since the corresponding parameter takes a value greater than one. This
result is consistent with the S-curve effect of service frequency on airline demand
[Wei and Hansen (2005)]. Indeed, demand increases can be even more than pro-
portional to frequency increases because of the quality effect.
On the contrary, we find a relatively low price elasticity of demand. Aggregate
demand increases by about 6 per cent for every 10 per cent decrease in average
prices. The high proportion of routes with islands as endpoints (19 of 35) in our
sample could explain the low price elasticity of demand. Although routes where is-
lands are one of the endpoints should have a high number of leisure passengers, the
lack of intermodal competition can make passengers less sensitive to prices. For
this reason, we have estimated the demand equation for sub-samples of routes dif-
ferentiated by having or not islands as endpoints. The coefficient of prices for
routes that have an island as an endpoint takes a value of about -0.40, while that
value is -1.07 for routes that do not have an island as an endpoint.
Table 3: MARKET SHARE EQUATION RESULTS – TSLS – (N = 215)
Instruments for log(Pjk/Pk): log(equipjk/equipk), log(APjk/ APk)
Coefficients (White standard errors; Robust to heterocedasticity)










1. Significance at the 1% (***), 5% (**), 10%(*).
2. The variable for relative prices (Pjk/Pk) is measured through the dummy variable for price dis-
counts (Ddiscount
jk).
3. The variable for relative quality (Sjk/Sk) is measured through relative flight frequency (FQjk/FQk).
Source: Own elaboration.Table 3 shows the results for the market share equation, where the variable for
relative prices is treated as endogenous. As in the demand equation, the variable
for relative service frequency could be endogenous. However, the same argument
and test for including this variable as exogenous in the demand equation applies in
the market share equation.
All explanatory variables have the expected signs. Coefficients for the vari-
ables for price discounts and relative quality are positive. Hence, airlines obtain
larger market shares when setting higher discounts and when offering higher
flight frequencies. Thus, the evidence is that airlines compete both in price and
quality to attract passengers. It can be expected that price competition is more im-
portant for the leisure segment of the market, whereas quality competition domi-
nates in the business segment of the market. We also find systematic differences
in routes with islands as endpoints.
Infrastructure dominance in short-haul air transport markets
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Table 4: PRICING EQUATION RESULTS – TSLS – (N = 215)
Instruments for log(Qjk): log(Nk), Disland
k
Coefficients (White standard errors; Robust to heterocedasticity)










1. Significance at the 1% (***), 5% (**), 10%(*).
2. The variable for quality (Sjk) is measured through flight frequency (APjk).
Source: Own elaboration.
Table 4 shows the results for the pricing equation of the full economy fare,
where the variable for demand is treated as endogenous. All the variables have the
expected signs.
We find some evidence of cost economies related to distance and traffic den-
sity. Full economy fares decrease by 4 per cent for every 10 per cent increase in
distance. The size of density economies is smaller (a 10 per cent increase in route
traffic density induces a 0.6 per cent price reduction), but the negative sign of the
variable for demand is consistent with the existence of decreasing marginal costs.Marginal costs can be understood as the sum of the costs of carrying an additional
passenger for a given capacity (which is expected to be constant) and the costs of
providing additional capacity [Brander and Zhang (1990)]. Additional capacity
can be provided by using bigger planes and/or by increasing service frequency.
Bigger planes are generally more efficient, while higher service frequency in-
creases the annual utilization of planes and crews. Both ways of increasing capac-
ity would imply decreasing marginal costs [Doganis (1991)]. However, it is worth
noting here that those effects should be exhausted at some traffic levels. In this
way, marginal costs should be constant if route traffic density is high.
In addition, a positive sign in the coefficient of the variable for airport pres-
ence is found. Full economy fares increase by about 1 per cent for every 10 per
cent increase in airport presence. Although the size of the airport presence effect
seems to be modest, it must be recognized that this effect refers exclusively to the
mark-up that airlines charge on marginal costs.
The variable for the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index is not significant. Taking
into account that our sample is based on non monopoly routes, previous studies
have shown that the effect of this variable should not be too important. Graham et
al. (1983) find that prices are positively correlated with route concentration, al-
though this relationship decreases with the level of concentration. Borenstein
(1989) finds that airport dominance matters more than route dominance in ex-
plaining airline prices. Finally, Evans and Kessides (1993) find an important price
differential in comparisons between monopoly and duopoly routes, but the differ-
ence is quite small when a third or fourth competitor is added.
Revista de Economía Aplicada
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Table 5: POLICY DISCOUNT EQUATION – LOGIT – (N = 215)
Coefficients (White standard errors; Robust to heterocedasticity)











Wald test (χ2) 48.08***
1. Significance at the 1% (***), 5% (**), 10%(*).
Source: Own elaboration.Infrastructure dominance in short-haul air transport markets
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Table 5 shows the results of the estimation for the policy discount equation. All
variables have the expected signs, although the variable for the Herfindahl-Hirschman
Index is not significant. We take into account a possible endogeneity bias of the vari-
able for aircraft size using data from the previous year7. In this equation, the positive
sign of the variable for airport presence is especially important, which means that an
airline’s share of an airport’s slots positively influences the probability of discounts.
The fact that a higher airport presence allows higher prices in the full fares along
with more frequent discounts on the lowest fares is consistent with the product differ-
entiation explanation of the airport dominance advantages. Finally, the negative sign
of the dummy variable for islands shows that the negative effect of the lack of inter-
modal competition outweighs the positive effect of more leisure travelers.
To sum up, the main result that can be inferred from the pricing and policy
discount equations is that higher scales of operations in an airport allow airlines
both to increase demand and reduce costs. An airline that takes benefit from air-
port dominance can increase demand since it offers a higher quality product. In
turn, the airline can also reduce costs by its better exploitation of density eco-
nomies. From our estimation, it can be inferred that a 1 per cent increase in fre-
quencies implies a 0.08 per cent increase in prices in the full fares, while a 1 per
cent increase in the relative frequencies offered by an airline implies a 1.24 per
cent increase in the discounts available. Overall, in our context, the cost effect
seems to be more important than the quality effect.
The evidence for the U.S. case [Borenstein (1989, 1991), Evans and Kessides
(1993), Berry et al. (1996)] shows that the quality (and market power) effects of
airport control on an airline’s prices is higher than the cost effect. However, the
cost effect was more important than the quality effect in the study by Marín
(1995) for the case of the European market. Our analysis seems to find a possible
explanation for that contradiction, since it demonstrates that the effects of airport
dominance vary for different types of fares. As airlines use different fares to dis-
criminate prices among different types of travelers (business and leisure travelers),
it is sensible to argue that it is necessary to differentiate the type of consumers to
which airlines address their services to achieve a comprehensive knowledge of the
effects of airport dominance.
We have estimated alternative specifications of the demand equation, the
market share equation and the policy discount equation to examine the sensitivity
of the results to the way in which variables for prices are constructed. The vari-
able for prices in the alternative specification of the demand equation is an aver-
age between prices in the lowest fare and full economy fare, while the variable for
price discounts in the alternative specifications of the market share equation and
the policy discount equation is measured as a ratio between prices in the lowest
(7) Discounts are strongly associated with the evolution of load factor figures since airlines try to
maximize the average yield per passenger. Other factors being constant, a bigger aircraft makes it
more difficult to increase the proportion of seats sold. Thus, it could be argued that the amount of dis-
counts and the size of the aircraft are simultaneously determined. However, the possible endogeneity
bias should be modest given that airline choices on aircraft size can not be rapidly altered and depend
on route characteristics (distance, demand forecasts, etc) and on the real fleet at their disposal.Revista de Economía Aplicada
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fare and full fare. The results for such alternative specifications are essentially
identical to those in our previous estimation8.
In the period considered, Iberia’s dominance of the national airport network
had two effects. First, Iberia was able to offer products of higher quality than its
rivals on most routes. This allowed them to attract business travelers through the
exploitation of demand side economies. Second, Iberia took advantage of cost
economies to capture leisure travelers by applying more frequent price discounts.
Both effects had an impact on competition in the Spanish domestic market.
Iberia carried a higher proportion of business passengers per flight and achieved
higher load factors per flight than its rivals9. As we mentioned above, the large
size of the Spanish market indicates that our results may be extrapolated to other
EU countries.
5. CONCLUDING REMARKS
The objective of this paper is to test the cost and demand advantages that an
airline can obtain from airport dominance in a market of short-haul routes and
characterized by congestion in its main airports. Our empirical model shows that
these advantages were related to flight frequency in the case of the Spanish mar-
ket during the period 2001-02.
Competition in the leisure segment of the market is mainly focused on price.
Taking into account that a high service frequency allows a high utilization of
crews and planes along with a cumulative exploitation of density economies, it
can be argued that airport dominance allows airlines to take advantage of cost
economies when competing for leisure travelers. As a result, airlines that benefit
from airport dominance are able to offer larger and/or more discounts in a market
segment where prices must adjust to costs.
In the business segment of the market, on the other hand, competition is
mainly focused on quality. In this case, airport dominance provides airlines with
demand side economies. A high service frequency is especially attractive for busi-
ness travelers who are concerned more with reducing trip times than with saving
money on a ticket for which they do not usually pay. Moreover, a high service fre-
quency allows an airline to exploit marketing devices such as FFPs more efficient-
ly. As a result, airlines that benefit from airport dominance can charge high prices
in the full fares without losing market share.
The fact that an airline that controls an airport network can offer large discounts
in the leisure segment of the market and, at the same time, can offer a convenient
(8) Results of this estimation are available upon request from the author.
(9) Even though the flight frequency offered by Iberia (44.15) was well above those of Spanair
(17.67) and Air Europa (19.29), the average load factor of Iberia was 0.70, while the load factors
of Spanair and Air Europa were 0.57 and 0.64, respectively. Additionally, according to data from
the Association of European Airlines (AEA) for the period considered, the percentage of business
travelers flying with Iberia was more than 9 per cent, while this figure was less than 6 per cent in
the case of Spanair.Infrastructure dominance in short-haul air transport markets
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flight schedule in the business segment of the market threatens the competitive posi-
tion of its rivals, and can seriously damage the effectiveness of competition.
In the Spanish market, Iberia has held advantages from airport control in the
period considered. Contrary to other network carriers, the former Spanish flag
carrier has shown a strong record of profits during the last years. The dominance
of a relatively large domestic market, within a context of airport congestion, arises
as one possible explanation.
We feel that the implementation of new rules for airport space allocation, es-
pecially regarding slots, could improve the scope of airline competition. In the
Spanish case, forecasts for the main airports predict a large traffic increase for the
period 2000-2015. Plans call for a doubling of the capacity of the largest airports
in the national network. A more balanced distribution of new slots in these air-
ports is required to guarantee airline competition. The use of market mechanisms,
such as slot auctions, higher posted prices or the development of a secondary trad-
ing market are policy measures which may overcome inefficiencies in the current
airport space allocation procedures.
APPENDIX
Table A1: ROUTES OF THE SPANISH DOMESTIC MARKET INCLUDED IN THE SAMPLE
Routes with origin Routes with origin Routes with origin
in Madrid in Barcelona in Palma Mallorca
Madrid-Barcelona Barcelona-Málaga Palma de Mallorca-Valencia
Madrid-Málaga Barcelona-Sevilla Palma de Mallorca-Málaga
Madrid-Valencia Barcelona-Bilbao Palma de Mallorca-Alicante
Madrid-Santiago Barcelona-Santiago Palma de Mallorca-Bilbao
Madrid-Bilbao Barcelona-Vitoria Palma de Mallorca-Menorca













Source: Own elaboration.Revista de Economía Aplicada
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RESUMEN
En este trabajo, se analiza cómo una compañía aérea puede beneficiarse
del dominio de una red de aeropuertos en un mercado caracterizado por
rutas de corto radio y congestión. Se estima un sistema de ecuaciones
para el mercado español de transporte aéreo. Los resultados muestran
que los beneficios del dominio aeroportuario, tanto en términos de de-
manda como de coste, son consecuencia de ofrecer una frecuencia de
servicio elevada. Una frecuencia elevada permite ofrecer mayores des-
cuentos en las clases de tarifas para viajeros por motivos personales y, a
su vez, establecer precios más elevados en las clases de tarifas para via-
jeros por negocios. Tales beneficios pueden perjudicar la posición com-
petitiva de aquellas aerolíneas con presencia limitada en los aeropuertos.
De ahí que una asignación equilibrada del espacio en los aeropuertos sea
crucial para garantizar la competencia.
Palabras clave: Competencia, transporte aéreo, modelos de ecuaciones
simultáneas.
Clasificación JEL: L13, L93, C30.